Events » Past Events » Drynachan Seminar » Drynachan 99 - Announcement, Report and Papers » The Boundaries of Objectivity and Subjectivity
The classical boundary separating the public, objective, physical world from the private, subjective, mental world is currently in dispute. Classical dualists allied by materialist scientists often argue for a clear separation of the observer from the observed and of the mental from the physical. They merely disagree about the reality status of the mental (about whether it can or cannot be reduced to a state or function of the brain). Current advocates of a "participatory reality" and of the socially constructed nature of knowledge argue that no subjective/objective boundary can be drawn. The mental and subjective interpenetrates with the physical and objective and cannot be extracted from it. I argue that the truth lies somewhere in between. For many purposes it is useful to distinguish observed phenomena (phenomenal reality) from the thing-itself. While observed phenomena are necessarily observer-dependent this may not be true of the thing-itself. The effect of the observer on the observed also depends on the nature of the observer, the observed, and the relationship between them. As Norbert Wiener has pointed out, observer-observed relations in physics are "loosely-coupled" while in psychology they are "closely-coupled." This produces entirely different "observer effects." For example, claims by some interpreters of quantum mechanics that "consciousness" is required to "actualise" subatomic events appear to be inconsistent with the nature of visual perception. About 5 to 8 photons are required for any conscious detection of light - in which case it is not possible to see a single photon. Consciousness of visual input also appears to require around 200 ms to arise - in which "actualisation" of an input by conscious experience would require causation to operate backwards in time. On the other hand, powerful observer effects are known to occur when the "observed" is a human being, and can become extreme in self-observation when the "other" is oneself. In such situations "observation" can produce "transformation."