Expansion or Restriction?
Mikael Stenmark is the author of an excellent book on scientism, which I reviewed a number of years ago, and a book on rationality in science, religion and everyday life. His original and rigorous thinking adds a new dimension to the subjects that he treats. This book is no exception. For many years the benchmark in science and religion has been the work of Ian Barbour, whose typology (conflict, independence, dialogue, integration) has been widely adopted. Stenmark subjects Barbour's work to critical scrutiny, and comes up with a more comprehensive scheme of his own. In the introduction he explains a number of key terms, especially 'scientific expansionism' (or scientism) whose proponents wish to expand the territory of science include religion. Conversely, there are ideological and religious expansionists who see science as a subset of their own disciplines. Restrictionism, on the other hand, means demarcated boundaries between the disciplines, as exemplified by the approach of Stephen Jay Gould.

Stenmark's thesis is that the relationship between science and religion has to be a multilevel or multidimensional one: understanding the relationship 'needs to take into account at least the social structure of science and religion, the aims of these practices, the kind of epistemology they exhibit, and their theoretical content (their theories, beliefs, all stories).' This description outlines the structure of the book in terms of the social dimension, goals, practices, epistemologies, rationality and the mutual shaping of science by religion or religion by science. With respect to practices, the author makes the important point that religion is an intellectual enterprise like science only in the form of theology. Hence the relationship between science and religion does not necessarily mirror that between science and theology. The discussion of goals is divided into differences between epistemic and practical goals, personal and collective goals, manifest and latent goals, all of which are useful distinctions.

Stenmark shows that trust and authority exist equally in science and religion, as does rationality and evidence. He criticises the oversimplified views of Richard Dawkins and Edward O. Wilson, who seem to see the issues in very simplified terms. A hypothesis is defined as an assumption made in order to explain a phenomenon or event. In this sense, it is doubtful that God is a hypothesis in the way that Dawkins suggests, as the Divine may be an experienced reality rather than a 'derived entity.' Nor is the question of rationality a simple one in a postmodern contextualised world. Stenmark usefully defines a person and not a belief as the locus of rationality, from which it follows that agents of rationality are always socially or contextually embedded. In addition, rationality is characterised by the capacity to make informed and responsible judgements on the basis of good reasons and with the possibility of peer feedback. In short, 'rationality consists of the intelligent use of our intelligence', hence one can distinguish between scientific and theological rationality. Moreover, religious rationality is what he calls an agent-rationality rather than a spectator-rationality, common to science and theology. Being is more than knowing.

In a chapter examining the claims made by scientific expansionists, Stenmark makes it clear that such people presuppose the acceptance of extra-scientific or philosophical claims. This raises the question of the relationship between science as such and scientific naturalism in the context of what he calls ideological or worldview expansionism. He distinguishes four possible positions and follows through their implications. This is a particularly useful exercise, since it enables the reader to see how far various arguments and positions can be made to extend. It is also important, as the author points out, to differentiate the various phases of science, of which he identifies four: the problem-stating phase, the development phase, the justification phase and the application phase. The question of how worldviews could and should shape these different phases is crucial and is thoroughly investigated. Much public debate takes place in terms of justification, and the author argues that at this stage one should not presuppose the truth of any particular worldview. Stenmark advocates scientific education which contains a study of examples of worldview influences on past and present scientific research.

The final chapter brings the analysis together. The starting point is that we can take one of three views on the relationship between science and religion: a) that there is no overlap, b) that there is an overlap or c) that there is a union between the domains. Version c) can be expressed either in terms of religious literalism or scientific materialism. Stenmark rejects Barbour's 'dialogue view' on the grounds that dialogue is a process rather than a position and analyses how the thought of some well-known thinkers fits into his scheme. In addition, his thinking, as we have seen, goes beyond the one-dimensional picture of science and religion implied in the monist, contact and independence views by bringing into the multidimensional framework the social, technological, methodological and theoretical dimensions, all of which is usefully schematised. This book represents a real advance in the field and deserves a wide readership.